<u>Learnings from the International Conference on "Challenges to Central Banking from</u> Globalized Financial System" held at the IMF in Washington D.C. September 16-17, 2002.

1. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK (C.B.) IN BANKING CRISES:

Main Causes of Banking Crises: > Loss of Confidence

> Liquidity Crunch

> Solvency Problem arising from excessive

volatilities

Sources of problem:

- 1. Domestic and external macroeconomic volatility
- 2. Credit Booms and Capital Inflows
- 3. Asset Prices bubbles and collapses
- 4. Excessive Public Sector Involvement & political pressure
- 5. Increasing currency and maturity mismatches
- 6. Legal and Prudential weaknesses

What can the C.B. do? Volatilities could be dealt with by:

- Reducing volatilities under domestic control.
 Implementation of steady monetary policies.
- Reducing exposure by diversification
 Foreign-owned banks
- Insurance Protection against volatilities

Derivative markets

• Financial Cushion

Capital levels to compensate for volatilities

Credit Booms and Capital Inflows

- Excessive credit creation and unsound financial expansion in the upswing.
- Surge of Short term and Unstable Capital Inflows

What should the C.B. do?

- Sterilization policies
- Controls on Capital flows
- Reserve requirements, Variable Capital requirements
 and other prudential instruments

Asset prices bubbles and collapses

- Bust create a Collateral induced Credit Crunch as the
 Value of securities held in banks is eroded
- bubbles could lead to output contraction
- bubbles distort financial decisions and credit risk management becomes difficult

What should the C.B. do to restrain excessive rise in asset prices?

- Difficult to identify a bubble.
- Not clear if monetary policy should be tightened

Excessive public sector involvement and political pressures

- Loan decisions of public banks likely to be subject to Political considerations
- Government influence on Credit allocation of private banks

- Interest rate caps and high reserve requirements
- Govt forcing banks t1o finance the budget and to hold govt paper at below market rates

What should the C.B. do?

- Independence of Central Bank
- Legal limit on government and public sector entities
- Privatize public banks

Increased Currency and maturity mismatches

- rapid transformation of currency composition of bank
 Deposits
- High domestic interest rate increases incentives to denominate debt in foreign currency
- Maturity mismatches to increase with the limitation of access to longer term financing
- limitations to hedging operations spread risks on the asset side

What should the C.B. do?

- Implement prudential measures that limit the scale of foreign currency denominated borrowing
- Promote deeper longer term credit markets
- Higher FE reserves reduce vulnerabilities. Increasing reserves in time of crisis is conducive to increase confidence.

∠ Legal and Prudential weaknesses

• Inadequate bankruptcy and insolvency legal framework


- weak enforcement of contracts
- Prudential regulations (PRs) unresponsive to business needs

What should the C.B. do?

- Strengthen the legal framework and contract enforcement mechanisms
- Review the PRs and compliance mechanism

2. CHALLENGES OF INFLATION TARGETING (IT)

- Different objectives or single objective ?
- Coping with succession of shocks
- Pass through devaluation to inflation low or high
- Use of escape clause: Credibility will be affected
- High interest rate response required for I.T. not appropriate for EM $_{\rm S}$: will Strengthen exchange rate (XR) but stifle growth and capital flows can put Pressure on XR.



Characteristics of ITL Countries

- Smaller GDP
- Fatter upper tail for inflation
- Higher govt debt
- Shallower financial systems
- Capital controls
- Greater exposure to economic shocks

Monetary Policy (MP) in ITL Countries

- transmission mechanism not clear
- tough setting for MP
- conflict with financial stability
- less market oriented targets & instruments
- policy formulation relatively varies
- more active foreign exchange intervention

Role of Financial Stability (FS)

- more attention to FS objective
- inherent conflict of clarity in adherence to objectives
- constructive ambiguity

Life after ITL

Choices of monetary regimes (i) dollarisation (ii) currency bonds (iii) Pegged XR (iv) Veiled IT (v) ITL (vi) Full Fledged IT

- FFIT or currency boards minimal degree of credibility
- Dollarisation very extreme
- Pegged XR requires capital controls
- VITs for industrial countries only